

CHINESE COMMUNIST PATTERNS OF STRATEGY AND NEGOTIATION

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
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
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SUMMARY

This report briefly reviews the significance for United States-China relations of understanding Chinese Communist views and practices concerning strategy and negotiation. It proposes that such understanding can be advanced by seeking themes and patterns in their strategic and negotiating behavior, seen against the context of general cultural premises about influencing behavior.

A basic discussion of interaction and influence provides guidelines for broadly considering conflict and cooperation, and the relation to these of strategic maneuvering and negotiation as major "national influencing strategies", whose nature and importance have often been obscured by narrow viewings. This leads to a consideration of the importance of interaction and influence in Chinese culture traditionally, and how they have been organized and managed by a complex combination of defined relationships, go-betweens, and avoidances - plus semi-institutionalized manipulation of all these aspects of the system. General Chinese models for cooperative organization, and for handling antagonistic relationships, are described.

Against this background, a number of major strategic themes are discerned in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, which echo those of classical Chinese writers on strategy. The main themes are avoidance of clinches, keeping the initiative, and the utilization of contradictory opposites. The most general principle is to enmesh the enemy in contradictions, while making positive use of them oneself.

For negotiation, the main point concerns the fact that Chinese negotiation involves several different styles, depending on the basic

relationship between the negotiating parties. For them, negotiation has involved either an adversary relationship where (as with strategy) every advantage is sought, or reciprocal deference based on an assumption of pre-existing basic harmony. American negotiators are very uncomfortable with the adversary style, and attempt to improve matters by our own diplomatic approach, which aims at the gradual working out of problems between opposed but equal parties. This, however, is just what the Chinese have traditionally distrusted and avoided in all spheres of interaction.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST PATTERNS OF STRATEGY AND NEGOTIATION

I INTRODUCTION

Chinese Communist views and practices concerning strategy and negotiation are of evident importance for United States-China relations. They have correspondingly received considerable military, diplomatic, journalistic and even scholarly attention. Such attention, however, has largely consisted of examining, in a rather separate and piecemeal fashion, various Chinese actions and statements in these areas which have been seen by us as puzzling, incongruous, or inappropriate in some way. In contrast, it is here assumed that such particular Chinese Communists statements and actions can not be adequately understood in and by themselves, nor by implicit comparison with American concepts and practices. Rather, we must look for regularities and order - themes and patterns - discernable in their observable strategic and negotiating behaviors, and view these in relation to their own more general context. This context is the "general influencing orientations" of the Chinese Communists, meaning their basic and typical patterns and premises for behavior related to influencing others and handling reciprocal influence from them.

The purpose of this report is to outline the nature and relevance of this proposed approach to a major problem, and to begin its specific application.

II PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The United States and the People's Republic of China certainly conceive of each other primarily as adversaries, and for many years each party has been busy with strategic military preparations. Each side has labeled its own preparations as defensive, yet each has shown marked concern that

the other's activities instead indicate aggressive intent and plans. That such a situation is not uncommon among nations should not obscure the fact that it displays basic incongruity and ambiguity; it is therefore confusing and difficult to evaluate. For instance, is the Chinese "defensive" label merely a ruse, is it due to a misreading of our behavior, or what? Perhaps the sort of obscurity and difficulty involved is easier to see clearly at a less sweeping level of strategic concern. Even brief examination indicates that Chinese Communist views of military strategy and action differ greatly from our own. Their obvious focus on manpower, guerrilla warfare, and prolonged conflict is very different from our orientation to modern technical equipment and firepower, and the two do not readily fit together. Two important consequences accompany this lack of fit - which of course also involves other less obvious and more subtle differences in strategic orientations. These basic differences make it unusually difficult to correctly interpret Chinese military actions, whether strategic defensive moves, threats or cautionary displays, or even in actual fighting. Our own difficulty in making reliable judgments may be offset in one respect by the similar obscurity of our actions to them, yet in another respect even this also has disadvantages - it is difficult to convey clear warnings or indicate certain limits by our own military acts and statements, as these may easily be misread. In a sense, this whole problem is epitomized by the evident possibility that a war between the United States and China might occur without definite intent on either side, and the likelihood that this would become a long and costly stalemate, because the two parties can hardly come to grips clearly even in terms of force.

The picture for negotiation is rather easier to observe - this area allows more contact, short of war, and more open reporting - but strikingly

similar in general form. Incongruously, again, in spite of the lack of formal governmental recognition, and the existence of reciprocal suspicion and hostility, the United States has been extensively involved in diplomatic negotiation with Communist China; in the Korean armistice negotiations, the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, and the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Indeed, as Young notes, we have had "more continuous diplomatic contact and diversified dialogue with the government in Peking than any of the non-Communist Western governments with embassies there."^{*} At the same time,

* Young, Kenneth T. Negotiating With the Chinese Communists. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968. P. 3-4.

however, although these negotiations have had some constructive results, they obviously have both been quite limited in their achievements - again, a near-stalemate - and difficult to conduct. Moreover, it is apparent from Young's detailed descriptive material, and suggested also in other accounts** that

** E.g., reports of various American negotiators reproduced in Peking's Approach to Negotiation: Selected Writings, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969.

these difficulties have not been due solely to conflicting practical and political interests. The approach and style of the Chinese Communist negotiators itself has often been puzzling and frustrating, even though the American negotiators have been men of ability, experience, and patience.

It would be nonsense to claim that important differences of interest or outlook can always be resolved by the test of negotiations, and no such claim

is made here. Yet handling such differences as well as possible is the purpose of all negotiation, and it would equally be nonsense to neglect the potential importance of negotiating styles and strategies for success or failure in this process. The United States will inevitably be involved in further interaction with China, no matter how our relationship develops in the future. The difficulties inherent in this can at least be clarified, and possibly be reduced, by gaining a better view of the Chinese Communist approach to negotiation. This already is one aim in the writings on specific United States-China negotiations mentioned above. The present study aims to broaden and deepen our view by seeking to discern basic negotiating practices and premises, some deliberate and some habitual and unconscious, which Chinese Communist negotiators take for granted, but which are not readily visible to us.

The corresponding situation for military strategy is both closely interrelated with that of negotiation, for reasons to be discussed shortly, and quite similar in nature. This similarity may not be immediately evident, because strategic military planning and action ordinarily involves less direct and obvious interaction with the other party than does negotiation. Yet observation, interpretation, and estimation of an adversary's behavior clearly is crucial for strategic planning also. The Chinese themselves have recognized this from earliest times to the present. Sun Tzu, their classic writer on strategy, said "Know your enemy and know yourself, and in one hundred battles you will never be in peril"; Mao echoes this in advising the need

* Quoted by Richard Harris, "The Philosopher Behind Red China", San Francisco Chronicle, January 5, 1969.

"to familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy's situation as well as our own, to discover the laws of action of both sides, and to take these laws into account in our own actions"*. In comparison to negotiation,

* Mao Tse-tung, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954. P. 14.

knowing one's adversary in strategic situations may be even more difficult, because contact, which provides information, is less. But this only increases the importance of the similar need to know as well as possible, so that the adversary's behavior can best be understood and one's own best designed to cope effectively with it - to minimize the problems of strategic judgement previously pointed out, and this no matter what one's specific policy aims may be. It should be noted, too, that such problems of judgment are greater the more different the adversary is from oneself. Communist China is certainly extremely different from the United States and again, in strategic as in negotiating matters, adequate response to this obstacle requires that we aim to discern their fundamental and general strategic premises and patterns, as the necessary context for correctly viewing more specific and concrete behavior. This brief study can only be an introduction to such a sizeable task, but it does attempt to make clear its importance, to illustrate how it can be approached, and to state some relevant findings. In games involving enormous stakes, even modest gains in skill are important.

Two further general points about the significance of this study need explicit mention, although they have been implied above. On the one hand, its relevance extends, in part, beyond Communist China alone. As will be discussed, some important features of Chinese Communist strategic orientations relate to traditional Chinese cultural patterns. Fetter under-

standing of these is therefore pertinent to handling our interaction with any Chinese political entity. On the other hand, there is an equally important limitation of such knowledge. It must always be kept in mind that strategic maneuvering and negotiation involve an interaction between two parties. Better knowledge of Chinese patterns should help in dealing with them, but for optimum clarity and effectiveness, we need to examine equally our own characteristic patterns, and the way in which the two approaches are most likely to intersect.

III GENERAL APPROACH - CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND INFLUENCE

In line with categories of our language, we usually tend to think separately of negotiation and strategy, especially since strategy is commonly thought of primarily as strategy in military operations; this separation is reflected in the foregoing discussion. We tend to distinguish even more sharply between cooperation and conflict, allies and adversaries. But such distinctions can sometimes be quite misleading. The discussion above has already indicated some similarities between negotiation and strategy, and has noted that both negotiation between the United States and China and strategic preparations have for years gone on simultaneously. Even if we would not subscribe completely to the position of the Chinese Minister of Defense on the Taiwan Straits confrontation - "Fight, Fight, Talk, Talk"** - it is plain that even

* Peng Teh-huai, "Fight, Fight, Talk, Talk", Peking, New China News Agency, October 6, 1958. Translated in Peking's Approach to Negotiations...

war itself is usually preceded and followed, and often even accompanied, by negotiation.

Such connections, moreover, are more than a matter of temporal association

or sequence. They exemplify fundamental relationships that become visible when negotiation and strategy, and conflict and cooperation, are examined together in terms of a larger conception of interaction and influence. Whenever any two parties are involved in an ongoing relationship, their interaction will involve certain basic features inherent in this situation. Since all observable behavior is communicative, and all communication exerts influence, so long as any contact exists the two parties will necessarily influence each other. Further, this influencing process will largely, and probably primarily, be oriented toward defining the nature of the relationship - that is, toward defining the role and status of each party and what each may expect in the other's behavior. This is obvious when one or both parties wants to bring about any change in the relationship, but it is equally true even if both are satisfied with the status quo, since in this case, the parties must behave in such a way that the given situation is reinforced, and not disrupted. Interaction is never static, but always a process of maintaining or shifting a dynamic equilibrium.

These general characteristics of interaction in an ongoing relationship apply no matter what the size, nature, or specific aims and attitudes of the parties involved. At this level, also, so long as the parties remain in some contact it does not matter whether they are labeled (by themselves or others) as adversaries or allies, or their relationship as one of conflict or cooperation. For example, if actual relationships are examined closely in terms of the conflict-cooperation dichotomy, it becomes clear that both conflict and cooperation are always involved, though one or the other may be emphasized and over time there may be striking changes of emphasis. Clearly, even the best of "allies" encounter difficulties between themselves and must resort to friendly discussions to

deal with these. Equally, though less noticeably, there must be some minimum of explicit or implicit cooperation between the worst of "adversaries" for interaction to continue - perhaps strained negotiations or, at the worst, mutual resort to hostilities under some common rules of fighting. Such simple labels as "conflict" and "cooperation" remain handy, and they can be very important practically; to the extent that parties take them seriously they may greatly influence the ease or difficulty of conducting a relationship. Nevertheless, the basic point remains: any relationship necessarily involves a continuing, active process of reciprocal influence and adjustment, with advantages and disadvantages on both sides.

Other general characteristics of this influencing process need pointing out. First, since influence is an inherent aspect of all communicative behavior, interaction always involves a combination of influence by habitual and unconscious behavior, and conscious and deliberate attempts to influence the other party. Although there are many terms for various aspects of this process, such as bargaining, negotiation, persuasion, pressure, and strategy, there does not appear to be any accepted comprehensive term for the whole. This itself may reflect a lack of overall viewing in the past. In any event, such influence also always involves some combination of verbal communication and the application of more concrete - physical, economic, or other - behavioral sanctions or rewards.

Where interaction between nations is concerned, attention is commonly focused on conscious, deliberately organized influencing behavior, of two kinds. At the communicational extreme there is diplomatic negotiation. At the other, there is the strategic use of force. In between, however, there is also a broad area of threats of punishment or promises of reward;

these may be either mainly verbal or conveyed by limited actions - for example, visible strategic deployment of forces. As this implies, negotiation also involves verbal strategies in defining the nature and probable consequences of situations and actions, which are interrelated and overlapping with strategies of concrete reward and punishment.

These several aspects of what might be called "national influencing strategies" make up the most evident and emphasized part of "international relations," although this may also involve propaganda, cultural exchanges, and other contacts. The focal concern of this report is to examine such strategies, for the Chinese case, by viewing them in terms of the wider concept of interaction and influence described. The qualifying phrase is crucial. In inquiry as in other forms of action, the general approach adopted is most determinative of the outcome, and most considerations of negotiation and strategy focus on these subjects too narrowly. The result has been, paradoxically, to produce both over-emphases and underemphases in our views of the nature and importance of these matters.

For example, unbiased examination of negotiation and strategy is inhibited by common assumptions about cooperative and conflictful interaction. It has seemed plain, especially for international relations, that similar or complementary aims and interests naturally should make for easy and cooperative relationships, while different or opposing aims and interests correspondingly should lead to difficulty and conflict. In line with this, difficult international relationships commonly are explained primarily in terms of conflicts of basic material, ideological or status interests - rather than in terms of the strategic handling of these relationships. But perhaps this is too plain, and too simple. In recent years, various

studies have provided good views of smaller and more readily observable areas of ongoing relationships such as the family, business organizations, and labor and management. In these areas it is becoming increasingly clear both that persistent conflict can exist despite substantial mutuality of basic interests, and that cooperation can occur despite important differences of interest. There is no evident reason why this should not be true even between nations. But the "different interests" or "conflicting goals" theory of international relations tends to be self-validating. Given this simple common-sense idea, one looks first for differences of interest and goals between opposed nations. Some such differences can always be found, because no two parties, in any relationship, are in completely agreement. In fact, since the parties to any dispute themselves ordinarily emphasize such differences rather than anything else about their relationship, they are thrust upon the attention of any observer of the situation. So the hypothesis is "confirmed." Thus examination of the interaction process as itself a possible primary factor in international relations is forestalled. Instead, even when negotiation is considered worth serious study, it is prejudged as only of secondary importance: How has negotiation handled a conflict of interests?

Negotiation and strategy commonly have been viewed narrowly in other respects also. Although habitual and unconscious aspects of behavior may be influential in the conduct and outcome of even such highly deliberate behavior as formal negotiation and strategic planning,* these elements

* In fact, writers on negotiation do recognize that in diplomatic situations, which combine formal rules of behavior and deceptive bargaining, negotiators seek implicit behavioral cues to the other party's real

meaning or intent. But this somehow is left as a secondary matter; the possible significance of unconscious behavior is not pursued more deeply and systematically.

have commonly been neglected. The usual tendency to look at explicit negotiation and strategy concretely and separately, rather than as aspects of an overall influencing process, extends such restrictions on examining actual behavior still further. And negotiation, especially, has commonly suffered the further restriction of being considered normatively. The usual view is not "What was done, and with what effects?" in a certain kind of situation. Instead the usual viewing implicitly poses the overall question "What is the right way to conduct negotiations?" - although this attitude may be concealed behind the apparently factual inquiry "What does negotiation really consist of?"

Unfortunately, these popular biases and restrictions are reflected even in the serious literature in this field. The scholarly work of Ikle* may

* Ikle, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate. New York, Praeger, 1964.

be taken as an example, precisely because it is one of the best studies. Ikle's preface very properly points to the shortcomings of diplomatic histories, memoirs, and manuals, and he displays an admirable analytic concern to question what often seems self-evident. Yet by defining negotiation in the limiting terms of explicit agreements, he puts everything less explicit at best in the secondary position of "side-effects", and anything unconscious and habitual somewhere in limbo. In addition, he also displays some implicit normative orientation - toward viewing Western customs of diplomacy as proper

negotiation and Soviet practices that differ from them as unorthodox or abnormal.

All of these limiting approaches restrict progress toward gaining a larger and more systematic view of the actuality of international negotiation and strategic maneuvering. Normative viewings separating ideal from actual behaviors, hard-headed viewings separating the explicit from the implicit, factual viewings separating specific acts or statements from their contexts - all viewings which promote selective treatment of available data according to pre-determined external criteria are likely to obscure any order inherent in the behavioral data themselves. This also has serious practical consequences. Without the development of systematic knowledge, more of practice must remain dependent, somewhat uncertainly, on art and experience. And especially when such limitations on knowledge go unrecognized, as is common, they act to restrict both one's view of how other parties are operating, and of how one might most effectively operate to influence them.

There is, of course, no way of knowing in advance the extent and nature of discernable order in any domain of strategic and negotiating behavior. But it is known that such discerning of order would be valuable, that certain approaches obstruct this as described, and that by using other investigative approaches a considerable degree of order is often discernable in social behavior that initially appears variable, inconsistent, unusual, and hard to define. Thus, for example, clinical psychologists make orderly sense of deviant behaviors in our society, and anthropologists find consistent patterns underlying the queer customs of native tribes.

What is required, then, for the effective pursuit of order and system? A primary need, by now obvious, is a general conception of the phenomena being studied and their context, in relation to which specific data on actual behavior can be viewed. But this alone is an insufficient basis for promoting perception of order in certain important segments of reality.

For instance, Schelling's penetrating study* analyzes strategic bargaining

* Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. New York, Oxford University Press, 1969.

and maneuvering between parties using a framework closely related to the conception of interaction and influence discussed here. His analysis, however, is at a very general and abstract level (although well illustrated by concrete examples). His approach thus aids in seeing specific practices in relation to general concepts, avoiding the extremes of seeing them either in isolation or as universal norms. But this level of analysis is not readily applicable toward gaining a better view of any order inherent in the strategic and negotiating practices of particular nations. Since any socio-cultural unit tends to develop its own characteristic system of concepts and practices, in all spheres of behavior, this may constitute a potentially significant intermediate level of organization. Any such standardized approach to strategy and negotiation, including aspects taken for granted and unrecognized, will constitute the norm or "reality" of bargaining for the specific party holding it, and its particular nature will be significant in any actual interaction involving this party.

The present study is aimed at this intermediate level. It is empirically based on the close examination of statements and descriptions of Chinese Communist practices and conceptions concerning strategy and negotiation. But the aim of this empirical examination is not the specification of objective facts at the usual level of specific details or specific instances. Rather it is, by looking at such material with minimal preconceptions, to discern what emphases and interrelations recur in the behavioral data - that is, themes and patterns characteristic of Chinese Communist negotiation and

strategy. In addition, any data available on influencing behavior in other areas may be examined similarly, in order to clarify the broader context of more general influencing orientations. This process of inquiry is inherently circular; examination of specific examples gives clues to more general themes, on the basis of which further specific materials can be reviewed, and so on*.

* This analytic approach is discussed more thoroughly in John H. Weakland, "Method in Cultural Anthropology", Philosophy of Science 18, 55-68 (1951).

This behavioral orientation also involves concentrating on observing how things are regularly done or conceived, rather than on seeking to explain why particular things were done by inferring unobservable sources and goals of behavior. In consequence of all this, the patterns discerned in important senses are both specific and general, both concrete and abstract, and both objective and normative.

In line with the breadth of this approach, a large amount and wide variety of data are relevant to the present inquiry. The materials utilized have included both Western observations and the Chinese Communists' own statements about strategy and diplomatic negotiation, traditional Chinese novels and dramas depicting strategy and maneuvering both in political and in family settings and their modern counterparts in Communist films and plays, and interviews with a variety of informants on Chinese negotiation in political, business, and family affairs.

Certain distinctions are important for effective selection and utilization of such varied material. One major distinction is that between Chinese Communist materials, such as Mao's strategic writings** and reports

** E.g. Mao Tse-tung, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

about their behavior by Western observers, such as Young's account of negotiating with the Chinese Communists.* Chinese Communist materials must be

* Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists...

taken as the primary sources, since they constitute direct expressions or projections of the themes and patterns to be clarified - even if, and perhaps even especially if, they are self-serving. It is important to recognize, however, that Chinese statements about their ideas and actions necessarily ignore what they simply take for granted. To get at this important level, observations of behavior are needed. For this, and for pointing out what is strange and problematic for us in the Chinese approach, Western observations are very valuable. These are necessarily secondary, however, because they inherently involve interpretation based on non-Chinese premises. Outside accounts from a different and less involved viewpoint than the American one, such as Lall's discussion of the Geneva Conference on Laos** represent a useful

** Lall, Arthur, How Communist China Negotiates. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

intermediate viewing.

A second, cross-cutting distinction is that between materials directly concerned with strategy and negotiation in international relations, such as the works just noted, and materials relating to influencing strategies in more limited spheres of social interaction. Such materials - say on negotiation and maneuvering in Chinese families, social or business relations, or local politics - obviously do not offer direct information on international maneuvering. But such small-scale situations are simpler and more readily observable, so that they are well suited for discerning the most basic and general cultural orientations concerning influencing processes. Any progress in discerning these is correspondingly useful toward clarifying their

more specialized higher level variants. Information on patterns in these smaller spheres again may involve either "native" expressions or foreign observations. And in this area especially, Chinese Communist materials may usefully be supplemented by examining information on traditional Chinese culture, for which detailed data are much more abundant, although leads from these sources must always be checked for consistency with direct information on Communist China.

IV THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERACTION IN CHINESE SOCIETY

Since this inquiry is necessarily largely circular, one could begin by examining either Chinese Communist patterns of international negotiation and strategy or the more general patterns of influence and interaction constituting their background and context. The latter choice appears preferable here for three reasons. 1) By and large, general patterns are easier to discern adequately than their specialized variants. 2) More adequate data are available, especially for concrete, first-hand materials. 3) This study is a first approach, not a final account. Therefore it is especially important to establish a foundation that will also serve for further specific inquiries.

It is important to recognize first of all that the Chinese traditionally have been extremely concerned with the importance of interaction and influence - although this appears in two opposite and apparently contradictory forms. Much in Chinese culture displays direct interest and concern about the strategic utilization of influence. From early times, Chinese history is concerned with political intrigue and maneuvering, both within and between states, and with the closely related subject of military strategy. For example, Sun Tzu's book on warfare*, written over two thousand years ago, is predominantly

* Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. by Samuel B. Griffith. New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.

a work on strategy. Moreover, these themes are not just the domain of specialists; they have been highly prominent in the most popular Chinese operas and historical novels, such as the Romance of the Three Kingdoms.* Similarly,

* Lo Kuan-chung, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, tr. by C.H. Brewitt-Taylor, Rutland, Vermont, Tuttle, 1959. A valuable analysis of this work, giving much attention to its emphases on strategy, was produced by Hu Hsien-chin for the Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures project supported by ONR (RCC document Ch 23, March 1947).

the even more famous novel Dream of the Red Chamber** is largely a story of

** Tsao Hsueh-chin, Dream of the Red Chamber, tr. by Chi-chen Wang, New York, Twayne, 1953.

influence and manipulation among the members of a big Chinese family. At simpler levels of Chinese daily family, business, and political life the prevalence of bargaining, negotiation of disputes rather than legal action, and the use of go-betweens all evidence manifest concern with influence and its management.

This concern also is clearly not confined to the traditional past. In the more recent period of Nationalist China, the warlord era was full of military-political maneuvering and negotiation very like that described in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the novel The Family*** described family

*** Pa Chin, The Family, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1958 (written 1931).

political in-fighting not so different from that in Dream of the Red Chamber, and "modern" Chinese students sought friends to act as their go-betweens in marriage negotiations even when rejecting the traditional marriage brokers.

And at least at this level, similarities still persist for Communist China. Mao Tse-tung himself has written extensively both on the management of political conflict* and on military strategy and tactics,** not only emulating

* To take only the most noted example, in On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

** Mao, Strategic Problems...; also Selected Military Writings, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

but acknowledging the influence of such sources as Sun Tzu and the Three Kingdoms. Like Sun Tzu, also, Mao has had many secondary commentators and paraphrasers.*** Chinese Communist dramas still give prominence to strategic

*** E.g., Li Tso-peng, Strategy: One Against Ten - Tactics: Ten Against One, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966.

maneuvering, whether on a person to person level, as when a patriotic Chinese verbally confounds a Japanese officer in the film The Red Lantern**** or

**** "The Red Lantern - A Working-Class Epic", Peking Review, No. 48, 36-37, Nov. 24, 1967.

militarily, as in the "new revolutionary Peking opera", Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy.***** Probably there is much less commercial bargaining now under

*** "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," Peking Review, No. 51-52, 12-33, Dec. 26, 1969.

Communism, although a news report claims that undercover "expeditors" still are busy making deals based on "relationships"*****. It is clear, however,

***** "The 'Can Do' men of Red China", San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 22, 1970.

both from film depictions and observer's reports, that one function of Chinese Party members is to act as go-betweens, in political, industrial, and even in family relationship problems - for example, as marriage go-betweens in the film Singing Above the Reservoir.

On the other hand, however, both traditionally and currently there appears an equal Chinese emphasis on almost automatic social order and harmony based on fixed rules of social behavior, on self-control rather than controlling others, and indeed a considerable avoidance of direct interaction and influence. Thus Confucius himself discoursed on the importance of proper performance of established roles in both the family and the state, and the harmonious and effective working of both when this is done: "There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son"** - and he made clear also

* Confucian Analects, Book XII, Ch. XI, in The Four Books, tr. by James Legge, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, n.d.

that this requires prolonged practice of self-discipline and training. The Chinese family system, based on Confucian concepts, similarly stressed the importance of harmony based on a whole system of defined differentiated but interlocking roles; this is represented in a whole literature of family instructions and clan rules for proper behavior and its maintenance. ** Ordered

** Cf. Liu, Hui-chen Wang, The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules, Monographs of the Association for Asian Studies, VII. Locust Valley, New York, J.J. Augustin, 1959.

rules of ceremony, formality, and courtesy have traditionally been prominent also for nearly all Chinese social relationships - among officials, between teacher and student, even among friends to a considerable extent. The extent

and significance of such rules and order may often be concealed by the ease and grace with which Chinese commonly learn to perform their roles, and by their basic underlying vitality. Yet it remains true that much of Chinese social interaction is based on principles almost opposite to what we see as close, direct, and free interaction among individuals. The Chinese ideal is toward minimizing such unstructured, uncontrolled interaction. Even deliberate behavior is muted - specific requests, pointed questions, positive statements are avoided, important matters are led up to gradually and indirectly by way of neutral or minor ones. The system involves framing of situations as well as ordering of behavior, "stage-setting" as well as performances.

Again, these emphases are not typical only of the past. Although today the specific content may be changed, and Confucianism is officially discredited, the idea of proper behavior according to established roles and norms - now as prescribed by the "Thought of Mao" - is as strong as ever, and perhaps more so than in the chaotic China of 1910-1950. Self-discipline in proper social behavior, now termed "anti-individualism", is one of the virtues most harped on by the Chinese Communists as vital to the kind of social order and progress they envision as ideal.*

* The importance of these themes, even in the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, and their relationship to traditional orientations, is discussed in John H. Weakland, "Cultural Aspects of China's Cultural Revolution" (Technical Report No.5 under this contract).

At first all this seems contradictory to the evidence just presented that indicated active Chinese concern with interpersonal influence. But both exist and in fact, like many apparent opposites, the two emphases go together at a deeper level. Perhaps the importance Chinese have always attached to using go-betweens illustrates the nature and connectedness

of the dualism most simply. Heavy reliance on go-betweens in negotiations suggests that in Chinese communication and influence are viewed as so important and powerful that interaction is a matter of concern in both senses - a matter of interest and significance which must be pursued, and a matter of anxiety which must be organized and restrained to avoid excesses and loss of control. And in fact, the two go together structurally as well: Extensive and subtle strategic maneuvering and influence tend to prevail especially in highly ordered systems of social interaction. The rigidity of the system makes this more necessary, while the profusion of defined rules and roles makes it more possible. In this respect, the Chinese social system resembles formal diplomacy itself.

Since an emphasis on rules of social interaction thus leads toward related manipulations of the rules, such manipulation also tends to become systematic - in fact, to become part of the social rules at a higher level; this breaks down the distinction between following the rules of interaction and manipulating them for influence. The same thing occurs at the level of individual behavior. A Chinese informant joined a social group and took charge of the entire conversation with her first remark, which "one-upped" everyone present. An American present commented on this as a very skillful piece of conversational maneuvering. The informant agreed as to what she had done, but said "You shouldn't call it maneuvering. That implies it is conscious, planned. It's not that way. It's in the blood, or in the mother's milk." - that is, habitual and pervasive, whether inherited or learned very early. Furthermore, since Chinese behavior is based so much on learning to perform automatically roles focused on social relationships, and since the roles are largely complementary, even performing one's own role properly influences others to behave reciprocally. Thus one should expect that Chinese will usually be operating and negotiating, as a matter of course, and often, in the many situations like business, politics and war where this is socially

defined as a proper conscious aim, they will be doing so even more. One should also expect them to be correspondingly skillful.

Of course, different particular styles of strategy and negotiation, each with its strengths and limitations, could accompany such a fundamental involvement with the combination of ordered interaction and manipulation of influence, and it is necessary to inquire what is typical for the Chinese at this more specific level. First, however, the main Chinese models of social relationship will be examined briefly, since these constitute the broad structures to which interactive styles are related - in effect, the general goals to which influencing strategies are related.

From what has been said already, one would expect that any Chinese relationship model would involve an ordered system. This is true, but Chinese culture has always displayed a talent for combining diversity with order, and here there are several interrelated alternatives. A major distinction in Chinese thought and action between people who occupy defined roles in some given system of relationships, and between people not so placed in one given system must initially be noted. In the first case, a family being a basic example, the persons are involved, often very heavily, in reciprocal (though not similar or equal) rights and obligations, regardless of their personal inclinations. In the second case, such as two strangers, in theory there is no bond at all and in practice interaction probably will be strongly avoided. New relationships sometimes may be created, essentially by adopting persons into some position in an existing system, and existing relationships may be broken - an incorrigible family member may as a last resort be expelled or "washed out" as an informant put it. There may even be important cases where the situation is unclear. Mao's division of the Chinese populace (plus certain outsiders) into the categories of "the people" and "the enemies of the people",* for example, seems to waver

* Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions..."

between "no-relationship" and "hostile relationship" for "the enemies of the people." Nevertheless, the view that if there is no defined relationship within a system, there is no relationship - and no responsibilities - at all remains a fundamental concept, both traditionally and today.

There are two quite different models of cooperative organization.* Each

* This analysis is based on John H. Weakland, "Conceptions of Cooperative Organization in Chinese Politics," presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Mexico City, December 1959.

model may apply to a wide range of sizes or kinds of social interaction, but like so much else in Chinese society both appear based on aspects of the family system. The "paternalistic" model involves a system of roles which are different and of unequal status but which interlock, under the wise and benevolent authority and direction of a single head. This is supposed to ensure harmonious and effective internal functioning of the whole. This is the standard model for leaders and adhering members of established Chinese systems. It was typical for imperial China, being also rapidly adopted by successful leaders of national rebellions. Maoist China in recent years also would largely seem to fit this pattern. This was not only an internal model politically, but also the model for Imperial China's foreign relations** - China as the leader of a varied

** Cf. John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968.

group of secondary, tributary states. Again, this resembles the role Communist China has attempted to promote for herself as the leader of the "true" Communist world since her split with the Soviet Union.

Chinese culture, however, has been marked by rebellion almost as much as by authority, and the rebellious ones have had their system too. Their model

was of "brotherhood", in which all the members are both equal and similar - at least in comparison to a Chinese father. This alignment is typically depicted as one leading, by its members operating in parallel, to effective resistance against external destructive forces. The Chinese Communists may have operated more in terms of this model in their earlier days; it still is prominent in their films, which keep emphasizing images of their "golden age" of guerrilla resistance to the Japanese and the Nationalists. Internationally, this model had some application in the 1950's, when the Chinese used to describe the Soviet Union as their "elder brother in the Socialist camp."

Chinese conceptions of social relationship thus stress reciprocity first and parallel but separate behavior secondarily; there is little idea of immediate mutuality. The situation for antagonistic relationship systems is more immediately pertinent here but, unfortunately, it also is harder to get a good look at. This difficulty does not arise because the possibility of antagonistic relationships is absent or ignored, but just the reverse. There is much indirect evidence to suggest that the Chinese have a keen awareness and anxiety about potential conflict (especially any direct confrontation between equals) at all levels of social interaction and for all sorts of issues, so that such situations, both in action and discussion, are denied and avoided as much as possible.

The whole Chinese emphasis on achieving harmony via an orderly system of relationships regulating interaction and avoiding equality, and on active promotion of cooperation, already imply this major concern. In addition, one can discern several common methods for handling potentially antagonistic relationships to prevent or at least limit confrontation. Where possible, at all levels from individual to national interaction, the Chinese have aimed for "non-relationship" rather than engage in a difficult one. This has been especially evident toward non-members of Chinese culture, who could not be relied on: play by the rules of the Chinese system. Thus, if minding their own Chinese business

did not suffice to avoid unpleasant contacts, a Great Wall might exclude the rude and aggressive barbarians. When total exclusion has not been possible - or where there was some benefit to the Chinese from contact - limited relations have been sought as the next alternative. These limitations have involved both restrictions of time and space - from the carefully spaced and infrequent diplomatic missions to Peking or foreign enclaves for Arab traders in Canton long ago, to the treaty ports reluctantly granted the Western powers, to the Canton trade fairs and carefully limited tourism and foreign political missions under the Communists today - and formal definition and limitation of acceptable contact behavior, again today as traditionally. Such limitations have been imposed, or in situations of weakness kept as tight as possible, by various combinations of power, economic rewards, the use of intermediaries to keep foreigners at a distance from the real seats of Chinese authority,*

* Cf. Maurice Collis, "The Misadventures of a Barbarian Eye", in Peking's Approach to Negotiation...

and skillful definitions of the situations; the Chinese have been adept both at being precise when it suited their aims, as in prescribing formalities of contact, and at being vague on substantive matters they wished to avoid. When pressures have been too great, the Chinese have fallen back, still controlling and minimizing contact as much as possible. If overcome, there was always the possibility of eventually absorbing an intruder into the Chinese system; then he can be dealt with in terms of this familiar system, on their home grounds. This last move is most clear in the field of war and invasion, but the strategic approach is similar in other areas of Chinese interaction.**

** Cf. John H. Weakland, "Chinese Communist Images of Invasion and Resistance" (Technical Report No.4 under this contract).

Where difficult relationships could not be handled within the Chinese system of proper behavior, yet could not be excluded in fact, verbal labeling of one party as excluded - as not properly Chinese (Chinese landlords and capitalists as not belonging to "the people"), or no longer a family member - has been common. Failing this, confrontation could at least be minimized by labeling the other party as inherently different and unequal. Where they could put it over acceptably, the Chinese preference has been to do this by taking a stance of benevolent superiority. If necessary, and worth it, they have taken the opposite position of deference and respect. Where struggle becomes acute, but inescapable, however, the Chinese tendency is to claim a position of total rightness for oneself and to define the opponent as totally wrong and contemptible; thus both the Chinese Communists and Nationalists repeatedly refer to the other side as "bandits".

To sum up, where possible antagonistic relationships have been prevented by positive structuring of roles and relationships, or avoided by having no interaction. Where some difficult contact has been either worth while or inescapable, efforts have been made to keep this limited and structured. If such limits were overwhelmed, gradually a new structure encompassing the intrusive party might be built. The means toward all these interrelated goals involved various combinations of power, reward, and verbal manipulation. To many the current behavior of Communist China may seem wildly different from the preceding account of traditional Chinese emphasis on avoiding or limiting antagonistic relationships, but it may be suggested that judgment on this should be reserved yet. On the one hand, it is clear that even traditionally the picture had two sides.* When conflicts escaped the ordinary system of restraints,

* For a good discussion of this, see Dennis Bloodworth, The Chinese Looked Glass: Chapter 26, "The Doveshaws". New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967.

they could be correspondingly violent and, as noted, extreme denunciation of opponents became part of the system - perhaps both prescribed and felt more strongly (though not necessarily accurately directed) because usually so repressed. On the other hand, various observers have already noted that the Chinese Communists often are belligerent in words but more restrained in action. Little has been done by them toward Taiwan, no troops have been sent to Vietnam; even in Korea, the fiction of "volunteer" troops served to maintain some official Chinese detachment.

On other pattern for handling antagonistic relationships - on a different level, though related to the Chinese inclusion-exclusion emphasis - needs mention. The Chinese have long been devoted to handling adversaries by dividing their enemies and forming alliances against them - but have been equally ready to shift and even reverse the line-ups to keep a strategic advantage in changing circumstances. This orientation also applies across the board from family relationships to national politics. It is most important and prominent in chaotic times where many parties are contending. The Romance of the Three Kingdoms provides probably the best illustration of this pattern, but the warlord era of the 1920's and early '30's is not far behind; the Chinese Communists themselves (both some individuals and as a party) have clearly been involved in various such shifting alliances, with the Nationalists at times, in terms of varying appeals for class support among the population, and most recently with the Soviet Union.

Against this background we may now proceed to examine some of the more specific themes in Chinese strategy and negotiation. The following analyses should be recognized, however, as not a final account but only a sample of what could be done with this approach. In particular, given more time and space, not only could additional significant themes be identified, but more

attention could be given to the situational contexts in which different themes occur, and to how various themes are interrelated in larger patterns. This last point, important in any inquiry of this sort, is especially critical here. Particular themes of Chinese influencing behavior are often stated rather plainly in the Chinese sources, but very unsystematically by our standards, and as a group these themes appear remarkably varied, complex, and even contradictory. Therefore adequate comprehension depends greatly on discerning the covert order, in Chinese thinking and behavior, that can underlie apparent complexity and opposition. One example, concerning the conceptual structuring of relationships between strategy and negotiation, will serve both to illustrate such order and to frame the subsequent discussion of these two main topics.

Chinese works on strategy focus particularly on military strategy (though often with political connections); they are concerned with situations of active conflict between pronounced adversaries. In Chinese thinking, such situations are sharply differentiated from, and opposed to, normal relationships where there is great emphasis on the maintenance of "harmony". That is, conflict is presented either as maximal - almost no holds are barred in Chinese political and military strategy - or as minimal. Yet despite this conceptual polarization, there is also much Chinese emphasis on the close coexistence of struggle and parleying - in their "Fight, Fight, Talk, Talk" viewpoint, in their wide and rapid shifts of alliance, and in the extensive maneuvering involved in everyday social relationships, even though Chinese dislike having this openly labeled as strategy. Order may be perceived in all this, however, by discerning that it involves conceptions of polarized opposites in both cases, but at different levels, such that one moderates or tempers the other. That is, the dichotomization of "conflict" vs.

"harmony" is undercut by the similar opposition, at a higher level, between this dichotomy itself and a similarly radical image of coexisting conflict and cooperation. This pattern of conceptual and behavioral structuring may be difficult to grasp at first, but it seems to recur importantly in a number of areas of Chinese thought and action.

V. THEMES OF STRATEGY

The subject of military-political strategy in particular is explicitly discussed by both ancient and contemporary Chinese writers. With some reference to Bloodworth's perceptive account of Chinese warfare, and to strategy as portrayed in the Three Kingdoms and in Chinese Communist films as background material, this section will examine some of the main strategic themes presented in the works of Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung (Strategic Problems...), and Li Tso-peng previously mentioned. By and large, these three main sources present much the same picture, with differences of style or emphasis; they are complementary rather than differing in any major respect. This is expectable for Li's work, since it is presented as "An Exposition of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Thinking on the Strategy and Tactics of the People's War", but the same is largely true even for Sun Tzu and Mao; as Griffith notes, "Mao Tse-tung has been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought."* Therefore, in

* Sun Tzu, The Art of War.... Chapter VI, "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung", pp. 45-56.

order to obtain as clear and general a view of main themes as possible, these works will be analyzed jointly rather than separately. For the same reason, and because illustrations of important themes usually recur in a scattered way throughout these works, themes will largely be summarized and

paraphrased rather than quoted extensively, though selected page references to the original sources will be given in parentheses. Although these works focus primarily on military strategy and open struggle between adversaries, the strategic themes found there also have considerable relevance for more temperate situations.

First of all there is great emphasis on the political importance of war (Mao 20, Sun 63); Mao's famous dictum "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is no new idea in China - though in speaking only of open struggle and not of political maneuvering and negotiation, this gives only half of the Chinese picture. Even more, these works stress that in warfare not power but strategy is the decisive element (Mao 2, Li 1, Sun xi). "The essence of the great Chinese military tradition has always been that brains baffle brawn" (Bloodworth 312), so much so that it is stated "to win one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Sun 77).

For successful strategy, the first requisite is leaders of troops who are proper strategists. The importance of such individuals is especially prominent in Sun Tzu, and in fictional works such as the Three Kingdoms and the Chinese Communist films Hua Mu Lan and Women Generals of the Yang Family. Mao is in basic agreement with this, however, although as leader of a mass movement he puts less weight on individual genius and more on the proper training of people for strategic leadership. This training involves study on the one hand (Mao 13, Sun 63) and hard practical experience on the other (Mao 18, 29) in order to develop the two essential qualities of the strategist - knowledge and character. A strategist must carefully collect and analyze information so as to have a clear view both of the enemy and of one's own forces (Mao 16); also of the situation, both historically or analytically (Mao 2-5, Sun 63) and immediately and concretely (Mao 10, 79; Sun 105).

To apply such knowledge effectively, however, the leader must be not only cunning, but firm, determined, and courageous (Mao 19; Sun 65), yet also cool, somewhat detached, and cautious (Mao 55, 85; Sun 103). "We do not allow any Red Army commander to become a rash and reckless hothead and must encourage everyone of them to become a hero who, at once brave and wise, possesses not only the courage to overcome all obstacles but the ability to control the changes and developments in an entire war" (Mao 21). This emphasis on passionate determination and restrained analytic calculation, also stressed in many films such as Song of Youth and Daughters of China, may appear rather a combination of opposites. But this itself, as we shall see, is typical.

In addition to such leaders, successful execution of strategy is seen to depend on inculcating confidence and high morale in the troops, by informing them both of one's own rightness and strength and of the perils from an evil enemy (Mao 61; Sun 37), and on mobilizing similarly support from the general population (Mao 61-2; Li 32 ff.; Sun 64) - even by letting troops or population directly experience the enemy's destructive capabilities (Sun 137, Mao 83). These are the three prime factors in the view of Mao (Li 33) as of Sun Tzu (Sun 39) that men rather than weapons are decisive in war.

Assuming such support, though, what kind of strategy do these Chinese strategists employ? We will consider three main strategic themes: Avoiding the clinches, keeping the initiative, and contradictory opposites.

It makes obvious sense that the Chinese Communists worked hard at "avoiding clinches" in which they might easily have been crushed by the far greater forces of the Nationalists or the Japanese in the 1930's and 1940's, preferring to fight elusive, mobile, guerrilla-style warfare.

But this does not appear to be the whole, or even the basic picture; avoiding clinches seems a much wider, older and deeper principle for the Chinese. Even when the Chinese Communists were far stronger and the Nationalists weakening in the late 1940's, the Communists still preferred to maneuver flexibly and bypass or outflank any strong Nationalist positions. Sun Tzu also stressed maneuverability (Sun 69-70), indirect forms of attack, avoiding being cornered or even cornering the enemy - since this would lead him to fight more desperately (Sun 109-110; Bloodworth 321); the one apparent exception is that a general may place his own troops in a corner (on "death ground") so they will fight desperately (Sun 137, 139), but this must be done deliberately. In Bloodworth's phrase (Bloodworth 329), to the Chinese "life itself is a guerrilla operation". In war, even more, danger and uncertainty are everywhere, yet the Chinese strategist seeks to insure certain victory, or at least to be certain of avoiding defeat until a more favorable situation can be arranged (Li 33). The key to all this, in fact, appears in Li's title, Strategy: One Against Ten - Tactics: Ten Against One, which but condenses major themes from Sun (79-80) and Mao (109). With proper strategy, one against ten can succeed, and ten against one succeed. One can operate confidently and effectively either from a clear position of weakness or from a clear position of strength. But a confrontation between equals, one against one, is uncertain and to be avoided in war (Sun 25), as it is everywhere else in Chinese affairs.

But how does one operate strategically from the other positions? If one's forces are weak, "one against ten", one retreats, eluding and tiring the pursuing enemy (Sun 80), and "luring him in" deep into one's own familiar and friendly territory (Mao 46; Li 24, 31). Then, at appropriate points, by dividing the enemy's forces (Mao 62, Li 26 ff.) and concentrating one's own

strength, local superiority great enough to insure successful attack can be achieved (Mao 106; Sun 98). If one's forces are superior, then one can encircle and crush the inferior enemy (Mao 112; Sun 79). In the former case, one aims at a protracted campaign plus quick decisive local attacks (Mao 123 ff.); in the latter, at "battles of annihilation" (Mao 130).

It is evident, however, that these two polar situations and strategies are complementary opposites. To succeed in either against an enemy who will try to counter with the other, one must seize and keep the initiative (Li 8). Essentially, this appears a matter of getting the enemy to respond to one's own moves, in predictable and desired ways, while avoiding any such response to his moves (Sun 109). "Those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him" (Sun 96). Various possible moves to accomplish each half of this strategic goal are mentioned. Probably the most basic way to maneuver and control the enemy's actions is by stage management, creating situations to which he will naturally respond - a means which fits well with general Chinese orientations toward behavior organized in terms of proper role response to defined situations. "The stage of action of a military commander is built upon objective material conditions, but with the stage set, he can direct the performance of many lively dramas, full of sound and color, of power and grandeur" (Mao 20). "Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures: ostensible profit they await him in strength" (Sun 93). When the stage is set secretly, as is very common, the enemy may be confronted with a fait accompli to which little positive response is possible. Surprise attacks (Mao 114) and ambushes are

recommended, and often portrayed in Chinese Communist films. Sun Tzu even states that "All warfare is based on deception" (Sun 66), but this may be of many kinds. Instead of secrecy, stage-setting may involve open displays of apparent strength, or of casual unconcern by generals known to be cautious, as gigantic bluffs (Bloodworth 314). Or display and secrecy may be combined in feints; "Make a noise in the east but strike in the west" (Mao 77), or even "Sometimes I send agents to the enemy to make a covenant of peace and then I attack" (Sun 146). Personal disguise and impersonation also are important; the heroes of Chinese revolutionary dramas may disguise themselves as anything from knife-grinders (The Red Lantern) to bandits (Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy) to gather information and set traps.

All of these tactics naturally must have their counterparts, to keep the enemy from similarly influencing one's own plans and actions. In the first place one must be prepared for the enemy's campaign with a counter-campaign, in order not to be "forced into a passive position" and hurried reactions (Mao 59). One must plan ahead, not just immediately but on a long range basis, seeing a campaign as a whole, not just parts of it (Mao 8, 101 ff.). But one must equally be flexible; "the frequent change of plan is all in the day's work" (Mao 115). One must even respond when conditions are favorable: "On the one hand, we must make timely use of weaknesses exposed by the enemy...; on the other hand, we must maneuver and disperse the enemy by our own actions" (Li 31). One should counter the enemy's moves and influence by adopting opposite courses, in a shifting and flexible way: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue" (Mao 69). The skillful general is unpredictable and does the unexpected; "he changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing" (Sun 137); "he is serene and

inscrutable", even "capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans" (Sun 136). Practicing deception himself, he is constantly wary of deceit by the enemy: "When he pretends to flee, do not pursue... Do not gobble proffered baits" (Sun 109). "When the enemy's envoys speak in humble terms, but he continues his preparations, he will advance" (Sun 119). Meanwhile, the strategist seeks information as to the enemy's true actions and intentions, from natural signs (Sun 119), from spies and agents (Sun, Ch. XIII), and from the loyal people (Li 34). Throughout, it is important to be cautious, to avoid underestimating the enemy and resultant rash actions, yet also not to cower before the enemy and be influenced by fearing him (Kao 53).

Many examples of apparently contradictory combinations of polar opposites are already evident in the above themes, and many others, some even sharper, are easy to find in these works on strategy. Mao speaks of "active defense", of defending in order to attack, of retreat in order to advance, of being devious in order to go direct (Mao 49; also Sun 102), of giving in order to take (Mao 82). Especially, as "one against ten" illustrates, there is weakness defeating strength. Mao emphasizes this further in an example of yielding to win, judo style (Mao 634), and in his statements that the Communists have much of their war material made and delivered by the economically and industrially stronger enemy (Mao 132). Again, Sun Tzu points out that discipline is necessary to feign confusion, courage to feign cowardice, and strength to feign weakness (Sun 93). Thus it becomes plain that polarity and the combination of opposites is itself a basic principle throughout Chinese strategic thinking and practice. As Li says "Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that there is not a single thing in the world without a dual nature" (Li 4). Naturally, the Chinese Communists phrase their dualistic emphasis in Marxist terms: "We study, analyze, and direct war by using the

principles of dialectical materialism" (Li 37). But dualistic viewing was Chinese long before it was Marxist, as Sun Tzu illustrates over and over. Yet recognition of the pattern is more important for understanding behavior than arguing about its source or label, especially when one must (just as with struggle, harmony, and their combination) decipher opposites piled upon other opposites. Mao discriminates sharply between the strategies of "left opportunism" and "Right opportunism" - and then presents his mixed strategy as a unitary counter to this pair of opposites. Most broadly of all, the Chinese tend to view the world generally in terms of polar extremes, and oppose this with an extremism of moderation (cf. Bloodworth 339).

In all this, the key point for strategy is that the Chinese Communists, like Sun Tzu before them, see duality and opposition - "contradictions" in their terminology - everywhere in warfare. The aim of strategy is to enmesh the enemy in such contradictions until he is eventually defeated by his inability to resolve them (Li 36ff.), while the Communists aim to win by taking positive strategic advantage of contradictions in order to turn retreat into attack, weakness into strength, threats of encirclement and annihilation into eventual total victory.

VI NEGOTIATION - CONTEXTS AND STYLES

Although negotiation is of great importance for Chinese, it seems to have received much less open discussion than strategy. Most of the readily accessible materials on Chinese Communist negotiation, in fact, consist of American writings which devote a major part of their attention to describing difficulties experienced in conducting such negotiation and in understanding the behavior of the Chinese negotiators.* Some information is available

* E.g., Keun, Dealing with the Chinese Communists...; and American authors in Feldman's Approach to Negotiation...

on more traditional negotiating practice, especially from interviews with Chinese informants, but such negotiation appears of a quite different character. All this, in fact, reflects the point of most importance here: The basic style of Chinese negotiation varies greatly with the context - most particularly, with the relationships presumed by the Chinese to exist between the negotiating parties. Meanwhile, our assumptions about negotiation are quite different and conflicting, in ways we usually do not perceive clearly.

Rather than attempting to discern and describe specific themes in Chinese Communist negotiation than, as was done for strategy, this section will concentrate on identifying the major alternative Chinese approaches to negotiation, the contexts in which they apply, and how the American approach to negotiation fits in with these - or fails to fit in.

Chinese informants asked about negotiation present a consistent, clear, and apparently simple picture: Almost any specific issue may be successfully resolved, to the satisfaction of both parties, if they take the right attitude and approach. The right attitude is composed primarily of tolerance, reasonableness, and mutual respect; those are expressed in an approach emphasizing care not to make another "lose face" - for example, gaining a point should not be phrased as a defeat for the other, and "logic" - that is, rational discussion of what is the right course to follow in a given situation. The parties must be willing to compromise, or make concessions. These, however, should not be phrased as bargaining, or as a quid pro quo, even when they might appear so to an objective outsider, but as each party seeing and agreeing to what is correct. Similarly, the "talking reason" involved might look like seeking a rationale for changing positions toward a basis for agreement, but this should not be made plain. The whole process involves much self-

control, which is seen as a very positive quality of character - but not an easy one. As one informant put it, the essential ingredient for successful negotiation, either to resolve conflicts or promote cooperation, is "patience"; the same informant, however, gave his interpretation of the Chinese character for "patience" as "a knife in the heart". The maintenance of patience, reason, and self-control is often aided by the use of go-betweens, who work out the details of agreement separately with the principals; these often meet only at the end of negotiation, to signify their accession to what has already been settled. The go-between may be an agent of lower rank who does not lose face by meeting objections to proposed arrangements, or a person of higher status, whose "face" must be respected by both principals, and whose proposals carry corresponding weight.

All of this sounds almost fantastically different from the accounts given by Young and others of Chinese Communist negotiation. Their accounts repeatedly stress and document amply that these negotiators, far from being tolerant and accomodating, built up all manner of difficulties. They clutched at every possible advantage, from initially proposing "loaded agendas" to being intransigent over small matters, not just issues of substance. They were very formal and distant at best, and actively provocative and insulting at worst - attacking American "face" rather than saving it. Aside from remaining patient - not to ease matters but to prolong them endlessly, and maintaining self-control - even their insults discernably were not spontaneous but planned, this whole picture of negotiating behavior is almost diametrically opposite to that presented above. Again, this opposition is the key to understanding. The informants' accounts, without being so labeled, referred not just to traditional practice, but to an ideal

Chinese model of negotiation of particular matters within the context of an established positive relationship, or at worst, negotiation to mend such a relationship that has been disrupted. In contrast, the Chinese-United States negotiations clearly have not only involved Communists rather than "traditional" Chinese; perhaps even more fundamentally, especially from the Chinese point of view, they have taken place in the context of an antagonistic relationship. They have stated this plainly, if not in exactly these terms. And in such circumstances, negotiation is conceived by the Chinese primarily as another form of struggle, in which every possible advantage should be pursued by any available means.* Chinese behavior in

* Cf. the several Chinese statements in Peking's Approach to Negotiation..., especially "Secret Instructions to the Chinese Army".

such negotiation should therefore be similar to strategic maneuvers, as these have been discussed here, rather than to negotiation in any sense more familiar to us.

This central point has been recognized in part by Young; he very correctly speaks of United States dealings with Communist China as "adversary negotiations." But the possible utility of this insight is severely limited by two other factors. Young recognizes this "adversary" nature of these negotiations, but it is plain that he finds this almost impossible to accept as an unpleasant but expectable fact of the situation. Instead, in common with most Americans who have had to struggle with this extremely difficult business, he quite understandably conveys that such behavior is somehow abnormal and wrong. Meanwhile, it is clear, if perhaps never completely explicit, that he and other American negotiators keep hoping and trying to change this situation, to induce the Chinese to become more reasonable negotiators in our terms, by patiently

adhering to the best Western standards of diplomacy. But this itself is likely to be a significant part of the problem. The Western approach to negotiation is fundamentally based on a concept of the gradual working out of problems between opposed but equal parties by open, though courteous, discussion. Unfortunately, as has been noted here repeatedly, open differences between equals are just what the Chinese have always distrusted and avoided, in all spheres of interaction.* Such discussion, even of minor

* See also Richard H. Solomon, "Communication Patterns and the Chinese Revolution" The China Quarterly, No. 32, 88-110, Oct. - Dec. 1967.

differences, is seen not as leading to progressive compromise and adjustment, but as probably leading to the uncovering of larger disagreements and rapid escalation of conflict. As noted earlier, even when an overall "harmonious" relationship is recognized as existing, the negotiation of specific problems must be approached with care.

It is all too plain, finally, that the United States and China do not now have any such fundamental positive relationship. Nor is this visible for the foreseeable future. In terms of the Chinese system, there appear to be three ways of dealing positively with a difficult relationship situation. One way is avoidance, which at least prevents escalation, and may cool matters somewhat over time. Another way is for the parties to improve their relationship gradually, beginning by discussing only minor, conventional matters on which everyone can readily agree. The third way is by one party freely and unilaterally presenting the other with a significant concession; to this a Chinese normally feels moved to respond generously in kind. None of these provides a guarantee of successful change - and all are unlikely to occur in the present state of relations between the United States and

China; yet some consideration of their possible future value might be worth while. In any case, it is useful to see, not just the magnitude, but the nature of the difficulties we face.

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13. ABSTRACT

This report discusses the potential significance for United States-China relations of a better understanding of Chinese Communist patterns of strategy and negotiation. These patterns are clarified by considering strategic maneuvering in relation to interaction and influence generally, and by viewing Chinese Communist behavior against the background of Chinese models of cooperative and antagonistic relationships.

Major strategic themes discerned include avoidance of clinches, keeping the initiative, and utilization of contradictory opposites. Chinese negotiation emphasizes either assumptions of harmony, or struggle between adversaries; the premises of Western diplomacy clash with both.

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